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Abstract
Social entrepreneurship increasingly involves collective, voluntary organizing efforts where success depends on generating 
and sustaining members’ participation. To investigate how such participatory social ventures achieve member engagement in 
pluralistic institutional settings, we conducted a qualitative, inductive study of German Renewable Energy Source Coopera-
tives (RESCoops). Our findings show how value tensions emerge from differences in RESCoop members’ relative prioritiza-
tion of community, environmental, and commercial logics, and how cooperative leaders manage these tensions and sustain 
member participation through temporal, structural, and collaborative compromise strategies. We unpack the mechanisms 
by which each strategy enables members to justify organizational decisions that violate their personal value priorities and 
demonstrate their varying implications for organizational growth. Our findings contribute new insights into the challenges 
of collective social entrepreneurship, the capacity of hybrid organizing strategies to mitigate value concessions, and the 
importance of logic combinability as a key dimension of pluralistic institutional settings.
Keywords Hybrid organizing · Social enterprise · Cooperatives · Institutional pluralism · Values · Renewable energy
Abbreviations
EEG  Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (Renewable 
Energy Sources Act)
GeG  Genossenschaftsgesetz (Cooperative Law)
RE  Renewable Energy
RESCoop  Renewable Energy Source Cooperative
Introduction
Extant research on social entrepreneurship tends to focus on 
formal employment organizations that pursue social mis-
sions through commercial ventures (Smith et al. 2013; Batti-
lana and Lee 2014; Battilana et al. 2017). Yet many forms of 
social entrepreneurship involve collective organizing efforts 
that depend on voluntary participation rather than formal 
employment and that pursue a triple rather than double bot-
tom line. Examples include community transformation ini-
tiatives in the developing world (Haugh and Talwar 2016; 
Pless and Appel 2012), sustainability alliances (Bowen et al. 
2018), and cross-sector partnerships (Nicholls and Huybre-
chts 2016; Sharma and Bansal 2017). Indeed, some scholars 
have argued that collaborative partnerships are required to 
produce effective solutions to large-scale social problems 
(Sud et al. 2009).
Despite the importance of collective, voluntary forms 
of social entrepreneurship, extant research offers limited 
insight into the challenges involved and how to manage 
them. Studies of social enterprise and hybridity tend to 
emphasize the twin challenges of preventing internal conflict 
among employees (e.g., Battilana and Dorado 2010; Bat-
tilana et al. 2015) and gaining support from diverse exter-
nal stakeholder groups while avoiding mission drift (e.g., 
Pache and Santos 2013b; Ramus and Vaccaro 2017). Yet 
collective, voluntary organizing initiatives often have few 
formal employees and must instead work to gain and sustain 
the participation of members who are not dependent on the 
organization. Research on worker cooperatives, collectivist 
organizations, and communities highlights the importance 
of sustaining member participation for long-term success 
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(e.g., Kanter 1972; Rothschild-Whitt 1979; O’Mahony and 
Lakhani 2011). However, this work does not explain how 
to do so when a collective pursues multiple and seemingly 
competing objectives, as in the case of social entrepreneur-
ship initiatives with a double or triple bottom line.
To develop new insight into how collective, voluntary 
social entrepreneurship initiatives sustain member partici-
pation, we conducted a qualitative, inductive study of Ger-
man Renewable Energy Source Cooperatives (RESCoops). 
RESCoops use a cooperative legal structure to pursue 
energy projects that meet community, environmental, and 
commercial objectives, attracting a diverse group of com-
munity organizers, environmental activists, local banks and 
municipalities, and private individuals as member-investors. 
Drawing on interview, archival, and observational data from 
eight RESCoops, we find that while members agree on RES-
Coops’ pursuit of community, environmental, and commer-
cial objectives, they disagree on the relative importance of 
these objectives, creating value tensions in the context of 
specific project decisions. RESCoops manage these value 
tensions through strategies of temporal, structural, and col-
laborative compromise. These strategies differ in how they 
enable members to justify project decisions that do not align 
with their personal value priorities, with varying implica-
tions for organizational growth trajectories.
Our study joins other recent work that seeks to bring val-
ues back into institutional theorizing (Kraatz et al. 2010; 
Kraatz 2015; Vaccaro and Palazzo 2015) and highlights how 
an ethics perspective can advance theory on social entrepre-
neurship and hybrid organizing. In particular, we contribute 
new insights into the nature of the challenges faced by col-
lective, voluntary social enterprises in gaining and sustain-
ing member participation, the capacity of hybrid organizing 
strategies to mitigate members’ dissatisfaction arising from 
personal value concessions, and the importance of logic 
combinability as a key dimension of pluralistic institutional 
contexts.
Social Entrepreneurship as a Collective, 
Participatory Organizing Process
Research on social entrepreneurship has tended to focus on 
formal employment organizations that pursue social mis-
sions through commercial ventures (Smith et al. 2013; Bat-
tilana and Lee 2014). Examples include work integration 
organizations that hire beneficiaries as employees (Pache 
and Santos 2013b; Ramus et al. 2016; Ramus and Vaccaro 
2017; Smith and Besharov, forthcoming) and microfinance 
organizations that employ loan officers tasked with deliver-
ing returns for investors while helping their clients escape 
poverty (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Zhao and Wry 2016). 
Studies highlight how juxtaposing social and commercial 
missions within a single organization can foster novel solu-
tions to seemingly intractable societal problems, while also 
recognizing the significant challenges social enterprises 
face in realizing this potential (e.g., Tracey et al. 2011). 
One stream of research emphasizes the potential for inter-
nal conflict to emerge between sub-groups of employees 
whose professional values and identities align with the social 
and commercial sides of the organization, respectively. As 
Battilana and Dorado (2010) show in their study of two 
microfinance organizations, conflict can ultimately become 
intractable, leading to declining organizational performance. 
Studies also explore how organizations can mitigate detri-
mental conflict, for example through hiring and socialization 
(Battilana and Dorado 2010), spaces of negotiation (Batti-
lana et al. 2015), formalization and collaboration practices 
(Canales 2014; Ramus et al. 2016), and pluralist managers 
(Besharov 2014).
A second stream of research emphasizes external chal-
lenges of gaining legitimacy and resources from stakehold-
ers who adhere to either a social welfare or commercial 
logic. Over time, such challenges create a risk of “mission 
drift” as organizations conform to the expectations of stake-
holders on whom they are more dependent for resources 
(Ebrahim et al. 2014). Research points to varied strategies 
and practices for avoiding mission drift and sustaining dual 
social and commercial missions, including governance 
structures (Ebrahim et al. 2014), stakeholder engagement 
and social accounting (Ramus and Vaccaro 2017), selective 
coupling of practices valued by different stakeholder groups 
(Pache and Santos 2013b), and managerial sensemaking (Jay 
2013). Studies have also started to examine these challenges 
and responses longitudinally, showing how dedicated exper-
tise, structures, and relationships associated with social and 
commercial missions, coupled with leaders’ paradoxical 
cognitive frames, can enable organizations to dynamically 
shift between social and commercial missions while sus-
taining both over time (Smith and Besharov, forthcoming). 
Taken as a whole, both streams of research provide impor-
tant insights into how organizations pursuing both social and 
commercial missions can avoid internal conflict and mission 
drift to sustain their duality over time.
By focusing on formal employment organizations with 
dual missions, however, extant research has overlooked 
important forms of social entrepreneurship, notably col-
lective social entrepreneurship involving “collaboration 
amongst similar as well as diverse [organizational and indi-
vidual] actors for the purpose of applying business princi-
ples to solving social problems” (Montgomery et al. 2012, 
p. 376). Such collaborations often cross sectoral boundaries, 
involving individuals and organizations from government, 
business, and nonprofit contexts. Collective social entre-
preneurship is therefore well suited to address community 
and environmental issues that require cooperation of diverse 
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participants for successful resolution (Haugh 2007; Peredo 
and Chrisman 2006; Jennings et al. 2013). To do so, col-
lective social entrepreneurship initiatives tend to rely on 
voluntary participation and commitment from a broad base 
of individual and organizational members, rather than on 
formal hierarchical control. For example, the social enter-
prise Gram Vikas seeks to create an “equitable and sustain-
able society” by working to transform deeply entrenched 
patterns of social relations in rural Indian villages (Pless and 
Appel 2012). Because this participatory initiative focuses 
on transforming an entire community system, it emphasizes 
the empowerment of intended beneficiaries through partici-
pation in a collective organizing process. In Gram Vikas’ 
water and sanitation program, for example, all villagers par-
ticipate in a set of democratic, self-governing institutions. 
While Gram Vikas facilitates the process of setting up these 
institutions, they are governed by and for the villagers (Pless 
and Appel 2012).
The emphasis on voluntary participation and the absence 
of hierarchical authority structures in collective social entre-
preneurship initiatives may render inapplicable employ-
ment-based strategies for delivering on multiple missions. 
For example, using hiring and socialization practices to 
manage divergent employee values (Battilana and Dorado 
2010) requires direct managerial control over organizational 
members. As Santos (2012) notes, the philosophy of con-
trol around which formal employment organizations tend 
to operate contrasts with the empowerment focus of par-
ticipatory collectives. It is thus unclear whether theoreti-
cal insights gained in employment-based social enterprises 
transfer to collective social entrepreneurship initiatives.
Although research on social entrepreneurship has not 
focused extensively on collective, voluntary organizing 
processes, other work in organizational theory offers pre-
liminary insights. Early studies of worker cooperatives and 
collectivist organizations (Kanter 1972; Swidler 1979; Roth-
schild and Whitt 1986; Rothschild-Whitt 1979; Whyte and 
Whyte 1988) and more recent work on community forms 
of organizing (Adler 2001; O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007; 
O’Mahony and Lakhani 2011; Seidel and Stewart 2011) 
point to sustaining member participation as a key challenge. 
Members tend to join collectives such as alternative schools 
(Swidler 1979), arts and cultural initiatives (Chen 2009), 
and political advocacy organizations (Jasper 1997; Polletta 
and Jasper 2001) in order to realize their values and identi-
ties, which often arise from strong ethical ideals. In order 
for members to continue their support and engagement, it 
is thus of critical importance that they perceive the ethical 
foundations of the organization to be upheld. Yet as collec-
tives grow, they tend to introduce formal organizing prac-
tices that risk undermining their espoused values (Michels 
1966; Piven and Cloward 1977; Osterman 2006). Over time, 
this process can lead to declining member participation, 
threatening community vitality and survival (Oakes et al. 
1998; Voss et al. 2000; Weinberg 2003).
Unlike the collectives studied in extant research, however, 
collective social entrepreneurship initiatives are not based on 
just one ethical ideology. They often combine social, envi-
ronmental, and economic convictions within a single initia-
tive in order to address complex sustainability issues whose 
solutions require collaboration from multiple institutional 
spheres (George et al. 2016). As Besharov (2014) notes, 
sustaining member engagement is more complex when the 
organization in which members participate pursues multi-
ple and seemingly competing objectives. Insights from prior 
research about the specific challenges involved in sustaining 
member participation, as well as how collectives effectively 
manage these challenges, may therefore be of only limited 
relevance for collective social entrepreneurship initiatives. 
Thus, while sustaining member participation is likely critical 
to the success of collective social entrepreneurship initia-
tives, neither prior research on collectivist organizations nor 
extant work on social entrepreneurship sheds light on the 
challenges involved in doing so or on the strategies through 
which initiatives effectively manage these challenges. In par-
ticular, it is unclear how participatory, multi-mission organi-
zations can honor their members’ diverse ethical convic-
tions as the collective venture develops. Our study therefore 
investigates the research question: How do collective social 
entrepreneurship initiatives engage members’ multiple value 
sets and sustain participation?
Method
We adopted a qualitative, inductive design suitable for 
advancing theory about issues not well understood in prior 
research (Edmondson and McManus 2007). As described 
below, studying German RESCoops allowed us to explore 
processes of collective, participatory social entrepreneur-
ship, which have received limited empirical research atten-
tion to date. Because this setting involves a plurality of log-
ics, it also offered an opportunity to extend prior scholarship 
that has focused on two institutional logics. To develop 
robust and transferable insights, we leveraged theoretical 
sampling and followed a logic of replication in our multi-
case study (Yin 2003). We selected diverse RESCoop cases, 
using each one to test and refine insights from the others. 
This approach enabled us to identify common patterns and 
mitigate over-interpretation of case idiosyncrasies in induc-
tive theory development. To further increase the reliability 
and validity of our qualitative inferences, we used vari-
ous forms of data triangulation, detailed below, as well as 
repeated member checks with practitioners in the field (Kirk 
and Miller 1986).
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Setting
RESCoops emerged as a new organizational population in 
Europe’s renewable energy (RE) sector in the early 2000s. 
They quickly developed into a model to organize grassroots 
involvement of citizens and local community organiza-
tions in the complex transition towards RE (Huybrechts and 
Haugh 2017). RESCoops consist primarily of private indi-
viduals of varied professional and personal backgrounds, 
and also frequently include institutional members such as 
municipalities, community banks, and local chapters of civic 
or environmental organizations. RESCoops bring these het-
erogeneous investors together to build large photovoltaic 
installations on roofs, green-field solar parks, wind turbines, 
biomass energy plants, and occasionally small hydroelectric 
power stations. In doing so, they pursue a tripartite mis-
sion of (1) profitably producing and selling energy, (2) using 
renewable sources to support environmental protection, and 
(3) allowing local community members to participate in and 
benefit from RE projects. In Germany, the setting for this 
study, there are over 800 existing RESCoops with more than 
167,000 members. They have invested nearly two billion 
euros in RE projects across the country and produce enough 
green energy for roughly 350,000 average households annu-
ally (DGRV, 2017). Along with other actors in the nation’s 
RE sector, they have taken advantage of entrepreneurial 
opportunities created by the Renewable Energy Sources 
Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG). First passed in 
2000, the law established feed-in preference and fixed feed-
in tariffs for electricity produced from renewable sources, 
instigating the nation’s ongoing energy transition.
Several features of RESCoops make them particularly 
well suited to investigate our research question. First, RES-
Coops are cooperatives that depend on the voluntary par-
ticipation of members who pool resources and collectively 
govern the organization. Although members join together to 
invest in and operate RE projects, dependence on the organi-
zation is generally low and direct managerial control of these 
voluntary participants is absent. Individuals who want to 
support RE have multiple alternatives for doing so, such as 
installing solar panels on their own homes and investing in 
RE-focused equity funds or company bonds. In addition, fol-
lowing the German cooperative law (Genossenschaftsgesetz, 
GeG), members are free to leave at any time and receive 
their equity share back after a statutory grace period. Mem-
bers are also not bound to the organization by any employ-
ment relationship or subject to a formal, hierarchical author-
ity structure. In fact, the unique cooperative principle of 
“one person, one vote” (GeG) requires that each member 
has the same voting right irrespective of equity share, com-
mitting each RESCoop to democratic governance structures. 
Commensurately, the main governing body is the general 
assembly of all members. To facilitate daily operations, 
this assembly elects a team of leaders, i.e., directors and 
supervisory board members, to oversee operations between 
general assemblies. In most RESCoops, unpaid volunteers 
who are themselves RESCoop members fill these positions. 
Taken together, these features make RESCoops an excellent 
context to study collective, voluntary approaches to social 
entrepreneurship.
Second, as “environmental social enterprise hybrids” 
(Huybrechts and Mertens 2014; Huybrechts and Haugh 
2017, p. 8), RESCoops espouse three distinct institutional 
logics—environmental (cf., De Clercq and Voronov 2011; 
York et al. 2016), community (cf., Schneiberg et al. 2008; 
Thornton et al. 2012), and commercial (cf., Pache and San-
tos 2013b; Thornton 2004). They thereby invoke three tra-
ditionally separate value systems and “engage in activities 
typically performed by three distinct organization[s] – com-
munity groups, environmental NGOs, and corporations” 
(Huybrechts and Haugh 2017, p. 8). As a result, RESCoops 
offer a rich context for understanding the challenges of sus-
taining member participation and strategies for addressing 
them, in collectives pursuing more than two distinct institu-
tional logics. They thereby provide an opportunity to extend 
prior research on social entrepreneurship, which has focused 
on organizing efforts involving just two logics (Battilana 
et al. 2017).
Data Collection
From 2014 to 2015, the first author collected interview, 
archival, and observational data on eight RESCoops in Ger-
many, as well as field-level data on the existing population 
of RESCoops. The eight purposefully sampled cases (Flick 
2009) cover all areas of Germany, were founded at different 
points in time, and have invested in all the common forms 
of renewable energies in Germany. In this paper, we draw 
primarily on 77 semi-structured interviews with RESCoop 
members, 1235 pages of case-specific archival materials, 
and 10 hours of observation of RESCoop meetings.1 We 
supplement these case data with field-level interviews and 
archival material. Table 1 summarizes the data we collected.
The first author interviewed 7–12 members per RESCoop, 
including initiative leaders as well as citizen and institutional 
members. We selected interviewees in order to capture the 
full range of perspectives in each RESCoop, asking inform-
ants to identify other informants with different opinions and/
or positions than their own. Interviews were semi-structured 
and followed a narrative approach (Weiss 1994) in which 
we asked informants to report on their experiences in the 
1 In the findings description, we refer to “Leader members” and 
“Members” to distinguish between informants elected into leadership 
positions within their RESCoops and other members.
385Managing Value Tensions in Collective Social Entrepreneurship
1 3
RESCoop. The interview guide covered topics including 
personal motivation to join and expectations of the RES-
Coop, participation in concrete projects and in general deci-
sion-making processes, individual and organizational chal-
lenges encountered, and the reactions of RESCoop leaders. 
Where relevant, the interviewer further probed on conten-
tious issues for informants and the personal compromises 
they made. While we allowed each conversation to develop 
naturally, we sought to cover the same topics with each 
informant, as relevant to their function within the RESCoop. 
Interviews with RESCoop leaders tended to be longer than 
those with citizen and institutional members, as directors 
and supervisory board members leading the organization 
naturally had more information to share about all aspects of 
RESCoop operations. Overall, interviews lasted between 30 
and 150 min, with an average of roughly 50 min. Interviews 
were conducted in the informants’ native language of Ger-
man. All interviews were recorded and transcribed verba-
tim. To triangulate and complement these interview data, 
we collected extensive archival materials on each RESCoop, 
including internal documents as well as publicly available 
data such as news articles from Factiva documenting each 
RESCoop’s development. In four cases, the first author also 
observed RESCoop member meetings during which he took 
extensive field notes.
In addition to collecting these case-specific data, the first 
author also interviewed seven field-level experts from the 
five regional and one national German cooperative asso-
ciations. Association representatives work as founding 
counselors, advising RESCoop leaders as they establish an 
organization and often continuing to counsel them as their 
organizations grow. As a result, they can offer a high-level 
perspective on the RESCoop population in their respective 
areas of Germany. Our semi-structured interviews with field-
level informants covered the founding process and opera-
tion of RESCoops in their region, typical challenges and 
best practices, legal requirements and cooperative princi-
ples upheld by the associations, as well as networking and 
Table 1  Data collected Case Founded Location Interviews Archival materials Meeting 
observation
1 2008 South 12 Internal reports (2)
Bylaws and website
Media articles (21)























7 2006 North 11 Bylaws and website
Media articles (47)
8 2010 Center 8 Presentations (2)
Bylaws & website
Media articles (5)
Field level 7 Cooperative association RESCoop bro-
chures (11)
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informational activities within and across associations. To 
further extend our understanding of the RESCoop popula-
tion and its institutional environment, we collected publica-
tions and population-level surveys from the various German 
cooperative associations, as well as field-level documents 
such as position papers on RE published by industry asso-
ciations, environmental NGOs, and the Association of 
Municipalities.
Data Analysis
Data analysis involved three main steps, focused on under-
standing members’ expectations for their participation in 
RESCoops and the approaches RESCoops adopted to meet 
these expectations. First, drawing on previous scholarship 
and our field-level data, we developed analytical ideal types 
of the three institutional logics relevant to RESCoops (cf., 
Almandoz 2014; Smets et al. 2015). We compared guide-
lines for RESCoops expressed in field actors’ reports to 
extant ideal types of institutional logics in the literature (De 
Clerq and Voronov 2011; Pache and Santos 2013b; Sch-
neiberg et al. 2008; Thornton 2004; Thornton et al. 2012; 
York et al. 2016), constructing field-specific incarnations 
of well-documented institutional logics to aid analysis in 
our research setting. We triangulated these ideal types with 
interviewees’ perceived expectations. This approach allowed 
us to check whether actors in the field and within RESCoops 
actually followed the three logics. It also led to a key insight 
that guided our subsequent analysis—we observed that while 
members agreed all three logics were important, they dif-
fered in how they prioritized the values underlying these log-
ics. Table 2 summarizes the ideal type logics we identified.
Second, we investigated how these logics, and members’ 
divergent prioritizations of them, were instantiated in RES-
Coop decision making. To do so, we developed in-depth case 
histories for each RESCoop detailing projects undertaken, 
challenges encountered, and final decisions implemented. 
We found that RESCoops regularly faced trade-offs between 
the different prescriptions of these logics as they sought to 
realize concrete RE projects. If unaddressed, these trade-offs 
could jeopardize members’ satisfaction with the RESCoop, 
resulting in loss of member support and, in the extreme, 
threatening the RESCoop’s continued growth or even its 
very existence. While the extent of trade-offs varied across 
specific projects, they consistently occurred, challenging 
RESCoops to develop reliable means of handling them.
In the third and final stage of analysis, we sought to 
understand how RESCoop leaders managed these trade-
offs and sustained members’ participation and support. As 
noted above, we looked for replicable patterns across cases 
to develop transferable theoretical insights (Yin 2003). 
To facilitate this cross-case analysis, we developed tables 
and graphs to identify common patterns in the case histo-
ries (Miles and Huberman 1994). This process surfaced 
three compromise strategies, each one offering a different 
approach to justifying project decisions that violated mem-
ber’s personal value priorities and carrying different implica-
tions for organizational growth.
Findings: Generating and Sustaining 
Participation in Collective Social 
Entrepreneurship
Facing Divergent Value Priorities
RESCoop members, these heterogeneous members tended 
to share an ideal of pursuing community, environmental, and 
economic objectives concurrently. Yet, this general agree-
ment on a triple bottom line orientation did not imply full 
alignment of members’ varied interests. Individual mem-
bers’ divergent value priorities became apparent in concrete 
Table 2  Ideal types of institutional logics espoused by RESCoops
Based on prior literature and analysis of documents issued by national environmental organizations, industry associations, the Association of 
Municipalities, and cooperative associations
Logic element Community logic Environmental logic Commercial logic
Organizational mission Support local welfare Protect the environment Generate dividends
Associated organizing model Charity Environmental NGO Business
Values embraced by RESCoop members Solidarity
Mutual support and self-help
Intrinsic value of nature
Intergenerational justice 




Prescriptions for RESCoop activities Creating local jobs
Sourcing locally
Fostering community
Reducing green-house gas 
emissions
Providing educational pro-
grams and energy audits
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project decisions, as these often required making trade-offs 
between elements of RESCoops’ tripartite mission.
Agreement on a Triple Bottom Line
Consistent with the RESCoop field as a whole, the eight 
RESCoops we studied sought to combine community, envi-
ronmental, and commercial concerns in a single organization 
and made an explicit commitment to a tripartite mission. 
This commitment featured prominently in RESCoops’ pro-
motional materials and websites, as illustrated in Case 2:
The [RESCoop] aims to offer citizens of the region 
an opportunity to actively contribute to a sustainable 
and decentralized energy supply by participating in 
our venture… This citizen activism will directly con-
tribute to a climate and energy future that will protect 
the environment for future generations, develop our 
region, and benefit local inhabitants by allowing them 
to share in value creation. [Website, Case 2]
Private citizens and local organizations who became mem-
bers and invested in the RESCoops tended to agree on the 
desirability of this tripartite mission. In fact, this triple bot-
tom line positioning was often what initially attracted mem-
bers to RESCoops rather than other forms of investment 
in the RE sector. Members tended to be well versed in the 
three logics their organization sought to combine, valued 
these logics, and believed in their potential compatibility. 
As one member explained when discussing his expectations 
and reasons for joining:
We want to show that renewable energies are beyond 
mere eco and idealist projects, that they can also make 
economic sense. That is the core of the venture – you 
can make money with such projects and protect the 
environment and do something for the community. 
[Member, Case 3]
General agreement on the importance of a triple bottom line 
united members, setting RESCoops apart from large utility 
companies and profit-driven RE project developers. Table 3 
provides additional illustrative examples of members’ com-
mitment to a tripartite mission.
Individual Differences in Value Priorities
While RESCoop members agreed on the importance of a 
triple bottom line in the abstract, they differed in the rela-
tive priority they placed on each component of the tripartite 
mission. For example, one member described community 
and environmental concerns as paramount, with financial 
considerations as secondary:
I do want my investment not to go down in value and I 
expect a certain return, but two other issues are clearly 
in the foreground for me… the ecological ideal – that I 
want to try to really use the most ecologically friendly 
energy source – and this ideal of citizens working 
together to benefit our region. [Member, Case 5]
Such equitable attention to two out of the three logics influ-
encing RESCoops was not very common in our data, how-
ever. Most members articulated a clear priority for values 
associated with one logic and described the others as sec-
ondary or tertiary to them personally. We describe these dif-
ferences in priority orderings below and provide additional 
examples in Table 3.
For some members, community development through 
regional investment was paramount. These individual citizen 
members and municipalities chose to join RESCoops first 
and foremost to strengthen their home town and region. They 
expected RESCoops to support community development 
by sourcing locally, creating local jobs or employing local 
tradespeople, sharing project benefits with local residents, 
and increasing the welfare of their community as a whole. 
They thus placed primary importance on values associated 
with the community logic: solidarity, mutual support, and 
self-help. In the words of one citizen member:
There is this principle of creating jobs locally and sup-
porting the farmers and tradespeople in our village. 
That is the idea of [this RESCoop], that you support 
the region, the people who live here, the tradespeople 
who offer their services here. That is what I like about 
it. [Member, Case 7]
In the extreme, a few interviewees who prioritized commu-
nity values described financial returns as irrelevant to their 
participation in the RESCoop and environmental concerns 
as secondary:
To me it’s not about the financial [dividend]. I don’t 
say: ‘I want to make profit.’ It is really just this ideal-
istic idea… to support regional activities, to strengthen 
the region… because I find this goal of regional energy 
supply important and forward-looking, ideally of 
course using renewable energy sources… I see the 
money [I invested] largely as a donation. [Member, 
Case 5]
Other members prioritized the environmental compo-
nent of their RESCoop’s tripartite mission, seeking to con-
tribute to climate protection, careful use of environmental 
resources, and an eco-friendly energy future. Environmental 
organizations and “green” individual members were espe-
cially interested in projects that offered green-house-gas 
reductions and minimal environmental impact. Frequently, 
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this entailed critically evaluating different green energy tech-
nologies and their implementation:
I am really in it for the ecology. Considering biogas 
plants, I get sick… Mono-cropping on the fields… 
really has nothing to do with ecology anymore. That 
has everything to do with making money!… I am abso-
lutely against the construction of further biogas plants. 
[Member, Case 5]
These members prioritized values associated with an insti-
tutional logic of environmental protection, such as the 
intrinsic value of nature and intergenerational justice in the 
use of environmental resources. Many environmentally-
minded members articulated the ethical responsibility they 
felt towards the environment and future generations. For 
example:
We have to start. We simply have to start. We must 
not say: ‘This little bit that I emit doesn’t do any dam-
age.’ Everything contributes. We have to think about… 
future generations. They also want to live in a safe 
environment! [Member, Case 4]
For these members, climate action and the construction 
of new energy supply infrastructure in the most environ-
mentally friendly way possible were more important than 
maximizing annual dividends or having the biggest possible 
impact on regional development.
Still other members were attracted to RESCoops primar-
ily for financial reasons, while appreciating environmental 
and community concerns. Local banks, for example, saw 
RESCoop investments as an opportunity to strengthen their 
local reputation and to develop business clients, as RES-
Coops frequently worked with these banks to finance their 
RE projects. For private individuals, renewable energy 
projects promised higher returns than conventional sav-
ings products in times of low interest rates. As one member 
explained:
Table 3  Illustrative data for heterogeneous value priorities
Empirical themes Data excerpts
Agreement on a triple bottom line Ecological thinking is only possible if I put economic thinking with it. I cannot always run a green 
operation that makes losses. That will fail, so I need to blend both things. I personally am a Green 
[but] business is business. That also has to work out… You just have to use the things that you have 
innovatively. And the third premise is to be self-sustaining, to support local structures as much as 
possible. That means to source from local farmers, to create jobs locally. That means developing the 
region… We always have to think of these things together. [Member, Case 7]
The aim that I think all our members support, is that we want to have an energy supply that is eco-
nomical and environmentally friendly [and] our activity should benefit the region… That means it’s 
about multiple things simultaneously. It is environmental protection… The financial side also has to 
work… And we of course care about the local community. [Leader member, Case 2]
Individual differences in value priorities We have roughly three camps in our RESCoop. One is this ‘Fukushima-Faction’ of people who said 
after that shock ‘I want to realize my personal energy transition with my investment and let my 
money work for something good, not just have it in the bank… I want to be part of the [green] solu-
tion.’ That is one group. The second group is people who find the cooperative ideal intriguing—self-
help for [the region], the community ideal, doing something constructive together. That is the second 
camp. And the third is people who are really looking for an investment, clean and regional, yes, but 
still very much a financial investment… I wouldn’t say we have 640 altruists here who are all directly 
descending from Mother Theresa. That is definitely not the case. (Laughs) [Leader member, Case 3]
Members of the cooperative naturally have an expectation of a return on their investments. That should 
also be the primary aim [of the RESCoop]… But right after that, I think, is this point to replace 
fossil energies with renewable energy production. And it should be a local project—not buying eco-
power from Norway or something. The PV-installation is here on a roof and the first 50% or so of 
that electricity is consumed in that building.… I’d say that should be the secondary aims. [Member, 
Case 5]
The emergence of value tensions Let’s say I want to realize a photovoltaic installation on the local kindergarten roof, because I want 
the kids to see how that works… how green energy is created. That will only yield 2% p.a. return, 
though. At the same time, I could build other installations that would yield 6% p.a. in the same time 
frame. How do I communicate to people that the 6% will be brought down by the installation on the 
kindergarten? [Leader member, Case 4]
At one of the general assemblies last year, we discussed contributing to wind power projects… For 
me, I would only have seen that realized with a heavy heart…I would have had an uneasy feeling, 
because it would have been a good wind plot, but I would have thought: It’d be nicer if it could be 
realized in the region rather than in this area, which is a few hundred kilometers off. [Member, Case 
5]
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First and foremost, it is an acceptable investment 
option. It yields a decent dividend… With the recent 
low interest rates on saving accounts, this is quite an 
acceptable alternative. I think they manage frugally. 
[Member, Case 5]
These commercially-minded members were most interested 
in stable returns on their investments, giving primacy to the 
values of return maximization and economy in operations 
associated with the commercial logic. Commercially minded 
members were thus supporters of the most cost-effective and 
highest yield RE projects. To realize these objectives, they 
were willing to place relatively less importance on commu-
nity and environmental concerns.
Data from field-level sources provide further evidence for 
these differences in individual priority orderings. For exam-
ple, when describing his daily work advising and supporting 
RESCoops, a cooperative association counselor explained:
Municipal representatives are always focused on the 
regional benefit: ‘Everything that is being realized has 
to benefit the region.’ For the environmental organiza-
tions, climate change and the ecological aspects natu-
rally take center stage. And for those people who have 
some money, when it comes down to it, they are nei-
ther truly interested in regional benefit nor in climate 
change. […] When a bank, even the local cooperative 
bank, joins, then they definitely have an economic ori-
entation. Money becomes very important. [Coopera-
tive association counselor]
Similarly, survey research on RESCoops conducted in 
Belgium noted “significant differences in preferences and 
interests across categories of members,” with considerable 
heterogeneity in profit, environmental, and social orienta-
tions of members (Bauwens 2016, p. 287).
The Emergence of Value Tensions
Differences in members’ relative priority orderings between 
the values associated with community, environmental, 
and commercial logics became salient when RESCoops 
embarked on specific projects. Most projects required 
trade-offs between values and few could maximize all 
three dimensions simultaneously. As a result, any particu-
lar project undertaken was unlikely to satisfy the priority 
orderings of all members. When planning a biogas plant, 
for example, a RESCoop might choose to use local con-
tractors and suppliers, thereby benefitting the community 
and speaking to values of mutual support and solidarity, 
but doing so could hurt profitability, reduce dividends for 
members, and thus violate values of return maximization 
and economy in operations. Decisions about what crops to 
use to supply a biogas plant also invoked trade-offs. While 
intensive, fertilizer-reliant corn cultivation offered one of the 
most profitable approaches, it had a considerable negative 
impact on local biodiversity and carbon footprint, thereby 
conflicting with the intrinsic value of nature, climate protec-
tion, and thus intergenerational justice.
Because members differed in their personal value priori-
ties, tensions could emerge when such project decisions had 
to be made. As one director explained:
We saw tensions arising around the topic of biogas… 
There are many ideological disagreements that bubble 
up, things like… how much mono-cropping in corn, 
appropriate fertilizer use. So, a lot of issues where 
some people are saying: That’s problematic. [Leader 
member, Case 3]
In another case, a RESCoop supervisory board member 
described tensions in project location choices, particularly 
for green-field solar and wind turbine projects:
Not every site is equally good. Can I do it here or 
do I have to go outside the region a bit? What about 
[the cost implications of] environmental protection? 
Because the more I have to invest, the smaller the 
return. I have to conciliate that somehow. I always have 
in mind that we have basically promised our members 
not to go much below a return of 3% p.a. So we have 
to see how big the return will be, and how can we get 
that return for our members so they will stay happy, 
because not all of them are doing it just for the envi-
ronment or regional benefit. [Leader member, Case 1]
Table 3 includes additional illustrative data on value ten-
sions, and Table 4 offers a summary of trade-offs and associ-
ated value tensions by type of RE project.
While value tensions were evident across all types of pro-
jects that RESCoops undertook and involved varying com-
binations of logics, our data indicate two important patterns. 
First, the potential for value trade-offs differed across energy 
type, from relatively uncontentious solar projects to more 
contentious wind and biogas projects. To capture this pat-
tern, Table 4 lists types of RE projects in order of their con-
tentiousness. For example, given that solar installations were 
not very disruptive to the landscape and produced hardly 
any noise emissions, especially compared to wind turbines, 
solar location decisions tended to involve less severe trade-
offs between community and commercial values than wind 
projects did. Also in contrast to wind turbines, solar instal-
lations did not pose a lethal threat to migrating birds and 
usually did not require forest clearance to be placed in high-
yield locations. As a result, they generally implied smaller 
trade-offs between environmental and commercial values as 
well. This pattern of solar projects being on the lower end of 
contentiousness and wind and biomass on the higher end is 
consistent with patterns of media attention at the field level. 
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While press coverage of solar projects was overwhelmingly 
positive, wind turbines and biogas plants were frequently 
questioned and attacked.
Second, trade-offs in this setting existed primarily 
between commercial and environmental values or com-
mercial and community values, whereas very few tensions 
emerged between environmental and community values. As 
Table 4 illustrates, 11 of the 18 key project characteristics 
involved trade-offs between commercial and community val-
ues and six involved commercial vs. environmental values. 
We found no instances where community and environmental 
values were perceived to be at odds by RESCoop members. 
This does not mean, however, that these values were always 
synergistic, as attending to community concerns did not nec-
essarily also address environmental concerns. For example, 
Case 1’s decision to place less lucrative solar roof instal-
lations in each municipality in its region heeded values of 
solidarity and mutual support, yet this decision did not affect 
environmental values, as the  CO2 avoided by these installa-
tions would be the same no matter where they were realized.
Strategies for Managing Members’ Divergent Value 
Priorities
Managing the value tensions that emerged in project deci-
sions was of paramount importance for RESCoops, not just 
for fulfilling their tripartite mission but also for retaining 
members. If members perceived their values to be violated or 
threatened, they could withdraw their contributed resources 
and leave the cooperative, putting the continued growth or 
even the very existence of the collective social enterprise 
at risk. To prevent such negative consequences and avoid 
members’ dissatisfaction with organizational decisions that 
did not align with their personal value priorities, the RES-
Coops in our study adopted three strategies, which we label 
temporal, structural, and collaborative compromise. Most 
RESCoops used one primary compromise strategy, with 
some also engaging a secondary strategy. We describe these 
strategies below, using case examples to illustrate our find-
ings. Table 5 offers additional examples for each strategy.
Temporal Compromise
The first strategy, which we label temporal compromise, 
involves oscillating in value prioritization over time. When 
privileging one value (or set of values) in a concrete project 
in the present, a RESCoop engaging in temporal compro-
mise simultaneously made credible commitments to privi-
lege other values in the future. In this way, the RESCoop 
sequentially attended to each of the different value priorities 
important to its members.
Temporal compromise was the primary strategy adopted 
in Cases 1 and 2. The RESCoop in Case 1 was initiated by 
Table 4  Types of RE projects and associated value tensions
Energy Key Project Decisions Value Tension 
Solar Roof: community relevance vs. lowest rent, highest sun exposure 
Contractor: local tradesperson vs. cheapest offer 
Supplier: German company vs. cheapest offer 
Location: least habitat disruption vs. lowest rent, best sun exposure 
PV panel: lowest toxicity, gray energy vs. cheapest 
Community and commercial
Environment and commercial
Hydro Contractor: local tradesperson vs. cheapest offer 
Supplier: German company vs. cheapest offer 
Location: least habitat disruption vs. lowest rent, best energy yield 
Community and commercial
Environment and commercial
Wind Service contractor: local company vs. cheapest offer 
Supplier: German company vs. cheapest offer 
Location: least landscape and noise impact vs. highest wind density
Location: least habitat disruption, deforestation vs. most wind density 
Community and commercial
Environment and commercial
Biogas Contractor: local tradesperson vs. cheapest offer 
Supplier: local farmers vs. cheapest biomass on market 
Land use: food production vs. energy production 
Energy crop: environmental diversity vs. biomass yield 
Fertilizer: non-finite resource, gray energy vs. cheapest, highest yield 
Community and commercial
Environment and commercial
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municipalities interested in developing the local region and 
contributing to their local climate protection plan. As one of 
the supervisory board members explained:
We want to generate the energy that we need in our 
own region.… Environmental protection, local patriot-
ism, and of course value creation for our region – those 
three things are extremely important to us! Because 
we want to keep the money that our region [spends on 
energy consumption] in our region. [Leader member, 
Case 1]
To symbolically emphasize its commitment to community 
development, the RESCoop even chose its name to match 
the acronym on the local license plate. Yet while it empha-
sized the local community, the RESCoop attracted over 
13 million euros of investments from private individuals, 
many of whom saw it first and foremost as an “acceptable 
investment alternative.” To balance its members’ divergent 
value priorities, this RESCoop realized a mix of projects 
over time. Seeking to benefit all the local municipalities 
involved, it undertook solar projects on public buildings in 
every town, but it sequentially interspersed these low-return 
projects with more profitable green-field photovoltaic parks. 
As another supervisory board member explained:
Smaller solar projects tend not to be quite as profit-
able, but we have decided that in each municipality 
we should have at least one solar installation on the 
roof of a public building… In larger [green-field] solar 
projects we therefore pay more attention to returns. 
[Leader member, Case 1]
To support overall portfolio returns and satisfy commer-
cially-minded members, the RESCoop even began investing 
far outside the area of its member municipalities, despite 
its name and local commitment. In particular, it decided to 
invest in a large solar park that was not only outside its home 
county but even in a different federal state. While leaders 
were aware of violating the values of community benefit 
and support for local tradespeople and contractors, they felt 
compelled to undertake the project to deliver on the values 
of return maximization and economy in operations prior-
itized by those who primarily saw their membership as an 
investment. In recommending this project, however, leaders 
made sure to credibly signal to community-minded members 
that they would actively seek to “repatriate” the investment 
in the future, as soon as they could find an equally profitable 
project opportunity locally:
Table 5  Illustrative data for compromise strategies
Temporal compromise strategy
In Case 2, the nascent RESCoop had realized two solar installations on roofs—one on a local school and another at a communal waste-water 
treatment plant. While the latter was economically less attractive than the former, possibly reducing the overall portfolio return, it was realized 
to satisfy the interests of different local communities involved in the RESCoop. The RESCoop’s leadership promised that the negative impact 
on overall profitability would be compensated in the future through a planned biomass project.
“While the [waste-water solar] project won’t really have much of an impact [financially] because of its size – only 15 kWp is being installed on 
that roof… we undertook this project to show that we are doing something in [village name]. There is some tension in the relationship between 
that village and the town. They always argue that everything is happening [in the town]. So we said, okay let us realize this second project in 
[village name]… Especially now that we are working on the remote heating project in [the town].” [Leader member, Case 2]
Structural compromise strategy
In Case 4, the initiator of the RESCoop explained:
“Imagine you have a super roof, facing South with an ideal angle, and you can reach six or eight percent annual return on your investment… 
And then you have a kindergarten, where you would also like to install solar [but] on a West or East facing roof. Projected return: four percent. 
Then everyone who invested in the eight percent project… would say: ‘We won’t let you ruin our portfolio return. I invested because of the 
eight percent… I only want to take [economically] better or similar projects.’ So, we developed a concept which can separate projects within 
the same cooperative structure.” [Leader member, Case 4]
Using the specialized loan vehicle of “Nachrangdarlehen,” the RESCoop has realized projects with a broad range of different priorities. Solar 
power projects have been realized with modest financial returns because they also benefited the local kindergarten and soccer club. At the same 
time, considerably more profitable solar units have also been installed. Moreover, the RESCoop has realized a local biomass powered heating 
grid and associated biogas plant.
Collaborative compromise strategy
In Case 7, despite the heterogeneous backgrounds and preferences of the RESCoop members and its leadership in particular, a common consen-
sus emerged that projects would only be realized if they generated benefit on multiple dimensions of the organization’s mission, prioritized by 
different sub-groups. Using this approach, the RESCoop realized a biomass-powered heating grid in its community and was considering work-
ing with a local university to research flowers as part of their biomass use. As one director explained:
“We are supporting every effort to cultivate plants that optimize our biogas fermenter… For example, plants that take up all the trace elements 
from the soil that are currently missing in our fermentation biology… And they even look great, they flower very nicely, absolutely enriching 
flora and fauna… That is just one example of what we do. With that we are pretty close. And so I repeat: economic profitability is an important 
goal but ecologically sensible measures can be very economical, too. That is no contradiction for me. These maxims always stand side by side 
for us.” [Leader member, Case 7]
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We realized [the project] outside the region in the legal 
structure of a Limited… The advantage is that as soon 
as we have a wind or solar power project ready in our 
region, we can simply sell [the Limited]. You can sell 
it more easily than having to sell a part of a coop-
erative… This compromise satisfied most sceptics. 
[Leader member, Case 1]
In summary, the temporal compromise strategy func-
tioned by giving serial attention to different values in con-
crete projects, compromising members’ heterogeneous pri-
ority orderings across time. To do so, it relied on members’ 
trust that the RESCoop would ultimately adhere to all three 
sets of values, even as specific project decisions created tem-
porary imbalances.
Structural Compromise
In the second strategy, which we label structural compro-
mise, RESCoops offered members a choice of different 
projects, enabling them to select projects that fit their per-
sonal value orderings. Making use of “Nachrangdarlehen,” 
a specialized loan vehicle under cooperative law (GeG), 
members primarily invested in specific projects which they 
could select based on their personal value priorities, rather 
than placing most of their investment in the cooperative’s 
general equity and the entire portfolio of projects. Members 
with different value hierarchies were thus structurally sepa-
rated and invest in different projects. In contrast to temporal 
compromise, prioritization therefore differed across projects 
rather than oscillating over time.
Cases 3 and 4 in our study relied primarily on structural 
compromise. In Case 3, for example, leaders compiled a 
detailed description for each project which clearly speci-
fied the cost and return structure, environmental impact and 
predicted emission reductions, as well as benefits to the local 
community through rents, local sourcing, and investment. 
Based on this information, members could decide for them-
selves what they wanted from a new project and what value 
trade-offs were acceptable to them, investing accordingly. 
One member explained:
A specialty of this RESCoop is that the projects are not 
in one big pot with a dividend that trickles out in the 
end. Instead, you are invested in one specific project. 
You can explicitly choose a project… The capitalist 
would say: ‘I’ll participate in the project with the big-
gest return.’ But one can also participate in a project 
that is close by – it may not have quite the best return 
because it doesn’t have quite as much wind or sun, but 
it may be much stronger on idealistic criteria [such as 
supporting the local community]. For example, when 
we put solar panels on a kindergarten, then there are of 
course idealistic aspects…We can support the kinder-
garten with cheaper electricity and also realize other 
idealistic goals [such as awareness raising for climate 
change mitigation]… I am really happy that citizens’ 
capital, like mine, can be used to realize such projects. 
[Member, Case 3]
Self-selection of members into projects reduced the bur-
den on leaders to actively compromise members’ heteroge-
neous value orderings and enabled RESCoops adopting this 
strategy to realize a broad variety of projects. A director in 
Case 3 explained:
Usually, we have projects with more than three percent 
return, [but we also have] idealist projects. For exam-
ple, for hydropower we’ll do it if it only breaks even, 
as long as we have members to invest in the project. 
That is the benefit of our system, that you can realize 
[commercially] weaker projects without dragging the 
portfolio down. If you don’t separate projects out, you 
would have discussions: ‘This really pays [but] you 
did this hydro-project and that barely breaks even.’ 
We don’t need to have these kinds of arguments. If we 
find people for projects [with a strong environmental 
benefit but low financial return], we do realize them. 
That is our principle. [Leader member, Case 3]
The structural compromise strategy thus functions by direct-
ing members’ investments to specific projects that deliver 
on their personal value priorities. Heterogeneous member 
preferences are thus more or less directly reflected in the 
project range of the RESCoop at any given point in time.
Collaborative Compromise
The third strategy, which we label collaborative compromise, 
entailed jointly developing common criteria for upholding 
community, environmental, and commercial values. Unlike 
structural compromise, collaborative compromise created 
organization-wide consensus about what minimum thresh-
olds were acceptable for all three sets of values, rather than 
allowing individual members to choose their own individual 
thresholds. Unlike temporal compromise, these threshold 
criteria were communally agreed and relatively stable over 
time, rather than shifting with each new project decision.
Cases 5 through 8 adopted this strategy as their primary 
means of managing divergent value priorities among mem-
bers. In Case 5, members included participants in local com-
munity clubs, chapters of environmental NGOs, and citizens 
seeking an acceptable investment, as well as the local munic-
ipal government. The RESCoop’s leaders, a community 
banker and a renewable energy engineer, established a cul-
ture of dialogue within the organization, routinely discussing 
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with members the guiding principles for their organization. 
A supervisory board member explained:
We put this on the meeting agendas, so that everyone 
knows we are not just reviewing numbers but actu-
ally discussing basic principles… And we note all the 
wishes of the members and then vote on the [criteria], 
developing a basic shared understanding… Even those 
who may originally say ‘no’ to a project can live with it 
when they learn that all the [criteria] are met. [Leader 
member, Case 5]
Such discussions were facilitated by the cooperatives’ demo-
cratic structure and the principle of “one person, one vote.” 
These features allowed all members to have a voice in the 
collaborative search for an acceptable value consensus irre-
spective of their individual equity share and thereby helped 
resolve controversies and maintain member support. As a 
director in Case 5 explained:
In our cooperative each member has one vote, no 
matter whether he has one share or twenty. Each per-
son has one vote and can thus influence the direction 
of activities in our general assembly. Last year, for 
example, we deliberately discussed wind power and 
we had a pretty diverse range of opinions. One said: 
‘Anything that isn’t nuclear power is helpful.’ Another 
said: ‘I deliberately invested here because I do not 
want ugly wind mills here in our region.’ Others had 
more nuanced opinions, saying: ‘Okay under certain 
circumstances—not close to residential areas, not in 
the forest’… And so in the end we decided on cer-
tain criteria under which we would consider a project. 
[Leader member, Case 5]
Collaborative compromise thus functions by jointly and 
democratically creating consensus on how to uphold the col-
lectives’ values when trade-offs occur in project decisions. It 
relies on members’ willingness to participate in discussions 
and to defer to majority decisions when necessary. It is thus 
focused on discovering or building value consensus among 
members, made concrete in explicit minimum criteria for 
acceptable RE project characteristics.
Towards a Comparative Framework of Compromise 
Strategies
Temporal, structural, and collaborative compromise each 
enabled RESCoops to mitigate dissatisfaction among mem-
bers, even though specific project decisions did not always 
conform to members’ personal value priorities. As a result, 
all three compromise strategies served to sustain member 
participation. However, RESCoops drawing on different pri-
mary compromise strategies had distinct growth trajectories, 
reflecting differences in how each strategy enabled members 
to justify value concessions.
Member Participation and Growth Trajectories
In terms of their ability to maintain voluntary participation 
and member support in the face of value tensions, the three 
strategies of temporal, structural, and collaborative compro-
mise were largely equifinal. Across cases that used different 
strategies, membership grew over time or remained stable, 
with attrition generally well under 10%. Moreover, when 
explicitly asked about satisfaction with their RESCoop’s 
activities, 76 of the 77 members we interviewed indicated 
general approval and no intention to leave their organization. 
There was also very little open conflict, despite diversity 
in members’ value priorities. As a cooperative association 
counselor explained:
To date, we have really not had any major conflicts 
occur… There is one RESCoop where there is some 
friction at the moment. There are disagreements 
between business and civic members of the coopera-
tive, and this has led to veritable arguments. But that 
is very unusual. [Cooperative association counselor]
Yet while all three strategies were associated with sus-
tained member participation, we found differences in organi-
zational growth patterns. Table 6 summarizes each RES-
Coop’s project portfolio, membership size, and total member 
equity invested by the end of 2015. As Table 6 illustrates, 
the cases primarily relying on temporal compromise (1 and 
2) grew the most in size and number of projects relative to 
their age. Case 1 was one of the largest RESCoops in Ger-
many in terms of assets held as of 2015. While Case 2 was 
the smallest RESCoop in our sample in terms of equity, it 
was the fastest in its founding process, realizing three solar 
roof installations in quick succession. Indeed, a cooperative 
association counselor we interviewed identified it as one of 
the fastest growing start-up RESCoops in the association’s 
region. By comparison, cases that primarily leveraged struc-
tural compromise (3 and 4) realized or were actively pursu-
ing projects using the most diverse set of RE sources. Case 
3, for example, had realized three wind turbines, ten solar 
installations, and a biogas plant, and was actively investi-
gating a hydropower station. In contrast, cases relying pri-
marily on collaborative compromise (5 through 8) tended 
not to expand beyond a single project and stagnated in size, 
despite their age. Three of these four cases (6, 7, and 8) 
realized one comparatively large project primarily involving 
biogas, and two of these (7 and 8) satisficed with this one 
project given the difficulties of expanding their portfolio. 
Case 5 tried to realize more projects but missed an opportu-
nity to participate in the development of a wind park due to 
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time-intensive discussions among members about accept-
able criteria for wind power investments. Facing challenges 
in integrating new members, Case 5 also failed to realize a 
biomass project.
Distinct Mechanisms for Justifying Value Concessions
The mechanisms through which temporal, structural, and 
collaborative compromise handle value trade-offs help 
explain RESCoops’ divergent growth trajectories despite 
convergence in terms of member retention. Specifically, the 
three strategies differ in how they enable members to jus-
tify value concessions—i.e., instances in which collective 
organizational decisions violate their personal value priori-
ties. We explain these implications below and summarize the 
key dimensions of difference between compromise strategies 
in Table 7.
In temporal compromise, organizational decisions and 
activities sometimes departed from members’ personal 
value orderings. Members had to accept the promise of 
future compensatory action for a violation of their own 
value hierarchies in the present, justifying an organizational 
decision they personally would have made differently. This 
compromise strategy thus required individual members to 
license—through prospective recompense—what felt like 
an infringement of their personal ideals. For example, a 
member may accept a lower return on a community roof 
solar project when anticipating a compensatory higher divi-
dend from a more profitable future green-field solar park. 
As an investment-minded member who primarily valued 
the commercial aspect of the RESCoop’s mission in Case 
1 explained:
We accept… that the dividends have to be a bit lower 
for a while if the municipality is using it to do some-
thing for the community with it… I have heard that 
[the RESCoop portfolio] is a very solid [investment] 
nonetheless. I have just talked with the former mayor, 
Table 6  Project portfolio, total equity, and member count by case
Data as of 2015. TC temporal compromise, SC structural compromise, CC collaborative compromise
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8
Strategy adopted
 Primary TC TC SC SC CC CC CC CC
 Secondary CC CC TC
Number and type of projects realized
 Solar on roof 10 3 10 3 3 1
 Solar green-field park 4
 Wind Planned 4 Missed
 Hydro Planned
 Biomass Planned 1 1 Failed 1 1 1
Size and age
 Age (years) 7 1.5 5 6 4 11 9 5.5
 Total equity (in million) 13.00 0.07 4.60 0.95 0.20 1.00 1.80 1.10
 # Members 1300 41 460 165 35 195 215 200
Table 7  Compromise mechanisms across strategies and implications for growth
Strategy characteristic Temporal compromise Structural compromise Collaborative compromise
Compromise principle Oscillate between values over time Self-select into projects 
with associated value 
priorities
Build consensus on acceptable value 
trade-offs
Justification of value concessions Transitory Not needed Shared responsibility
Approach to logic incompatibilities Deferred Avoided Explicitly discussed
Implications for growth Ease of integrating new members 
and raising equity
Potential for fast investment expan-
sion
Critical mass of mem-
bers needed for each 
project independently
Wide variety of pro-
jects possible
Increasing complexity in adding new 
members
Time-intensive decision-making processes
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who we know well, and I trust his word. [Member, 
Case 1]
Compromising ones’ value priorities could be justified by 
each member as only transitory. This requires, however, 
that the individual member continued to believe in the over-
all balanced orientation of the organization and trusted in 
promised recompense. Temporal compromise thereby defers 
acknowledgement of potential incompatibilities between 
the institutional logics espoused by the social enterprise 
ad infinitum. As long as the RESCoops adopting temporal 
compromise could credibly assure members of continued 
oscillation, value tensions did not have to be resolved. In 
consequence, these RESCoops gained flexibility for organi-
zational growth. Perpetuating the premise of a synergis-
tic triple bottom line, a RESCoop could relatively easily 
increase its investment capacity by admitting new members 
or allowing re-investments of extant members at any time. 
From this pool, leaders could invest in emerging RE project 
opportunities as long as they credibly signaled that future 
projects would attend to values not prioritized in the present.
Under a structural compromise strategy, in contrast, mem-
bers encountered very little personal value compromise in 
the concrete projects in which they were invested. Because 
they had detailed information on RE project characteristics 
when making investment decisions, they could select pro-
jects that align well with their personal value hierarchies. 
For example, they could decide what level of deforesta-
tion, financial return, and local contractor involvement was 
acceptable to them personally. This self-selection process 
spared members from compromising their value priorities. 
Thus, structural compromise avoids acknowledgement of 
potential logic incompatibilities by enabling self-selection at 
the project level. Members did, however, have to accept that 
the organization as a whole had a project portfolio that only 
partly aligned with their personal value orderings, and be 
willing to overlook that or justify it as a means of enabling 
each member to realize his or her own ideals. As a member 
from Case 3 explained:
Well, I am always watching for whether it still fits or 
whether some [mission components] win out over oth-
ers… I am not anticipating that will be the case or that 
I would have to withdraw my support from our RES-
Coop. I think this model [of everyone choosing their 
own project to support] is very stable… I get what I 
sign up for and others do too. [Member, Case 3]
As long as the RESCoop found members who subscribed to 
this premise, it could avoid value tensions in project deci-
sions and gain flexibility in project range, as any project with 
sufficient investors could be realized. This project-bound 
investment model could also slow growth, however, because 
projects had to be clearly specified before investments could 
be solicited, and they could only be realized if a sufficient 
number of like-minded members came together to fund 
them.
In collaborative compromise, leaders engaged members 
in a consensus-building or democratic voting process to 
establish value concessions acceptable to all or at least the 
majority of members. This approach allowed members to 
learn more about RE projects and reflect on, as well as pos-
sibly adapt, their own personal value orderings. In a discus-
sion of biogas, for example, an agreement to limit the use of 
corn could address the concerns of environmentally-minded 
members who might otherwise oppose biogas projects due 
to the negative environmental effect of monocropping. Col-
laborative compromise thus required that members were 
willing to invest time in discussion, and in the end, they 
had to accept the outcome of a democratic vote that may 
not have matched what they would have personally decided. 
For example, when asked what he would do if the general 
assembly were to decide on a criterion he did not personally 
support, a cooperative member in Case 5 responded:
What would happen? I could not oppose it in the coop-
erative anymore. That is simply a democratic principle, 
that I don’t petulantly say: ‘Okay, that’s it, I am leav-
ing!’… Instead, I’ll stay in the cooperative. [The deci-
sion] is legitimate. So I’ll say: ‘I am still opposed, but 
okay.’ And I will just try to continue to convince others 
that the criterion is nonsense. [Member, Case 5].
To justify compromising their personal value priorities in 
such joint decision-making processes, members diffused 
ethical responsibility to the group, thereby rendering value 
concessions more acceptable to them personally. Collabora-
tive compromise thus entails explicitly acknowledging the 
potential for incompatibilities between the logics espoused 
by the RESCoop and jointly, in dialogue and through dem-
ocratic decision-making, finding acceptable truces. If the 
RESCoop succeeded in developing a culture of active debate 
focused on collaborative problem solving, value tensions 
could be satisfactorily resolved for those involved in the 
process. Yet incorporating new members was increasingly 
difficult, as newcomers had to subscribe to the organization’s 
established value consensus and minimum project criteria. 
This in turn limited the ability to grow through new invest-
ments. The process also entailed potentially long discussions 
and extended decision-making processes, making it more 
difficult to realize growth.
Discussion and Conclusion
Although social entrepreneurship frequently involves col-
lective, voluntary organizing efforts little research to date 
has examined the challenges involved in such initiatives or 
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strategies for managing them. Our comparative, qualita-
tive, inductive analysis of eight renewable energy coopera-
tives in Germany identified sustaining participation in the 
face of members’ heterogeneous value orderings as a key 
challenge in these collective social ventures. As volun-
tary participants can easily withdraw from an organization, 
maintaining their satisfaction is paramount for sustained 
participation. While members were initially attracted to 
the initiatives we studied due to their positioning as tri-
ple bottom line businesses and agreed on the importance 
of multiple missions in the abstract, they frequently disa-
greed on the relative priority that should be given to each 
mission component in concrete projects. To sustain mem-
bers’ satisfaction with, support for, and participation in 
the collective social enterprise, RESCoops therefore had 
to convince participants to accept decisions that may vio-
late their personal value priorities. We found three strate-
gies for doing so—temporal, structural, and collaborative 
compromise—and uncovered the divergent implications 
of these strategies for organizational growth. Our findings 
make several contributions to research on social entrepre-
neurship and hybrid organizing, and in doing so highlight 
the importance of values for institutional theorizing (cf., 
Kraatz et  al. 2010; Kraatz 2015; Vaccaro and Palazzo 
2015) and the generative potential of an ethics perspective.
First, we offer new insight into the nature of the chal-
lenge involved in engaging multiple value sets and sustain-
ing participation in collective social entrepreneurship by 
calling attention to the role of individuals’ heterogeneous 
value orderings. Previous research on employment-based 
social enterprises has emphasized challenges arising from 
internal sub-groups disagreeing on the appropriate mission 
of their organization (Battilana and Lee 2014; Ashforth and 
Reingen 2014). In these studies, controversies and conflict 
arise as a single organization seeks to bring together employ-
ees from different professions who carry their respective 
value systems into the organization (Almandoz 2014; Glynn 
2000; Pache and Santos 2010, 2013a). In daily interaction, 
fault-lines emerge as employees’ values clash (Battilana 
et al. 2015; Reay and Hinings 2009; Battilana and Dorado 
2010). Although a few studies describe organizational mem-
bers who serve as carriers of multiple logics simultaneously, 
this work assumes members agree on the relative priority 
of logics, often implying they prioritize two logics equally 
(e.g., Smets et al. 2015).
In contrast, in the collective, voluntary social entrepre-
neurship initiatives we studied, individuals agreed on the 
desirability of combining multiple institutional logics, yet 
they disagreed on the relative prioritization of logics and 
their associated values. Differences in priority orderings 
are consequential, because organizational decisions fre-
quently require trade-offs between different values. Effec-
tively managing these trade-offs can help collective social 
entrepreneurship initiatives satisfy members’ diverse ethi-
cal ideals and thereby sustain member support and engage-
ment. In highlighting this issue, our study broadens existing 
understandings of the challenges involved in social entrepre-
neurship and calls for scholars to consider not just tensions 
between carriers of different logics, but also tensions that 
emerge when members accept multiple logics yet disagree 
on their relative importance. This issue may be particularly 
important when initiatives combine three or more logics, as 
the possibility for differences in priority orderings is greater 
than in dualistic contexts.
Second, we offer new insight into the management of 
hybridity and multiple logics by showing how strategies 
uncovered in past research address a broader set of chal-
lenges than previously recognized and by unpacking the 
mechanisms through which they do so. Our findings and 
theorizing about how temporal, structural, and collaborative 
compromise enable alternative ethical justification processes 
suggest that hybrid organizing strategies not only sustain 
divergent organization-level priorities (Battilana and Dorado 
2010; Smith and Besharov, forthcoming) and appease com-
peting institutional demands (Pache and Santos 2010, 2013), 
but can also ensure the ongoing participation and retention 
of members without recourse to employment-based manage-
rial practices and authority structures. Whereas much prior 
research has focused on why particular institutional demands 
are given priority, we unpack how the “losing” demands 
in organizational logic prioritization can be satisfactorily 
managed (Greenwood et al. 2011, p. 351), thereby extending 
understanding of the scope of hybrid organizing strategies.
In particular, past research has found that strategies 
of oscillating between competing demands or logics in a 
manner similar to the temporal compromise strategy we 
uncovered can enable formal employment organizations to 
uphold dual logics or competing demands over time (e.g., 
Smith and Besharov, forthcoming; Andriopoulos and Lewis 
2009). Our study expands this research by showing how a 
strategy of shifting priorities over time serves to accommo-
date members’ individual value priorities and sustain their 
participation, as it enables members to rationalize value 
transgressions as only transitory. By deferring recognition 
of the potential incompatibility of different values that the 
collective social enterprise embraces, not only does tempo-
ral compromise sustain multiple missions over time at the 
organizational level (the focus of prior work), but it can also 
mitigate estrangement at the individual level and maintain 
satisfaction of those having to accept (transient) violations 
of their personal values.
Prior research has also described structural separation 
of multiple logics, for example relegating them to sepa-
rate organizational sub-units through compartmentaliza-
tion (Binder 2007), as a strategy for mitigating conflict 
between groups of employees (Greenwood et al. 2011; Pratt 
397Managing Value Tensions in Collective Social Entrepreneurship
1 3
and Foreman 2000) and as a means of ensuring both logics 
receive dedicated attention and focus on an organizational 
level (Ebrahim et al. 2014; Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). 
Our findings add to this work by showing how strategies 
that structurally separate organizational components prior-
itizing different logics also support member satisfaction and 
participation. By enabling individuals to affiliate with the 
organizational component (in our case, an RE project) that 
best meets their personal value priorities, structural com-
promise allows individual members to realize their ethical 
ideals and thereby helps sustain their engagement. Nota-
bly, we find that this strategy does not necessarily require 
focusing on a single logic in a given organizational subunit, 
as in compartmentalization (e.g., Binder 2007). Instead, in 
the context of members’ general agreement on a multiplex 
mission, practices that structurally separate different logic 
hierarchies from one another are sufficient.
Past studies have also shown that opportunities for collab-
oration and negotiation facilitate the emergence of compro-
mise and prevent conflict between employees aligned with 
competing logics (Battilana et al. 2015; Ramus et al. 2016). 
Our findings on the collaborative compromise strategy used 
by RESCoops extend this work by highlighting the value 
to individual members of making collaborative decisions. 
That is, we show that collaborative compromise can not only 
prevent intergroup conflict or mission drift on an organiza-
tional level but can also enable individual members to justify 
violations to their personal value priorities. As decisions are 
taken jointly, individual members can diffuse responsibility 
for accepting value concessions to the collective. Further-
more, as collaborative compromise involves considerable 
discussion, individual members have an opportunity to learn 
about others’ value priorities and to revisit their own posi-
tions. Estrangement among members of the collective is thus 
mitigated and even members whose personal priorities may 
differ from the collective’s decision remain engaged.
Third, whereas prior research on social entrepreneur-
ship and hybrid organizing has tended to focus on settings 
involving just two logics and to treat them as contradictory 
(Battilana et al. 2017; Greenwood et al. 2011), by study-
ing initiatives involving more than two logics we reveal an 
important characteristic of higher-order pluralistic institu-
tional contexts: logic combinability, which we define as the 
extent to which the elements of two or more logics converge 
and can be jointly pursued by the same activity or practice. 
Even when logics and their associated values are not at odds 
with one another in a concrete setting, they are not necessar-
ily synergistic in that their demands may not be combinable. 
While proponents of each logic may be unlikely to quarrel 
with one another, they also may have no reason to collabo-
rate. Because their demands do not overlap, they may not 
join forces in opposing a third incompatible logic, instead 
taking issue with different features of the third logic.
In our study, for example, only two of the three binary 
relationships between logics were contentious. Commercial 
and environmental values as well as commercial and com-
munity values were often at odds in concrete project deci-
sions, whereas environmental and community values rarely 
conflicted. This situation enabled RESCoops as collective, 
participatory social enterprises to bring together a wide 
range of individual members without multiplying the poten-
tial for tensions. At the same time, the values underlying the 
environmental and community logics did not map onto one 
another. As a result, although the presence of environmen-
tally-minded and community-focused members did not in 
itself create incompatibilities, it also did not reduce the range 
of issues to be considered, as each logic clashed with the 
third commercial logic on different issues. Tensions between 
commercial and environmental values were therefore added 
to the tensions between commercial and community values. 
Moreover, while environmentally-minded and community-
focused members in our setting did not quarrel with one 
another, they also did not work together to collectively face 
the demands made by members prioritizing the commercial 
logic. Logic compatibility without logic combinability thus 
did not lead to the emergence of a combined community-
environmental faction.
These findings contribute to ongoing research on the 
opportunities and challenges of institutional pluralism 
(Battilana et al. 2017; Kraatz and Block 2008; Ocasio and 
Radoynovska 2016; Seo and Creed 2002) by suggesting 
that while logic compatibility may be valuable for realizing 
opportunities amidst institutional plurality, logic combina-
bility may be required to mitigate many of the accompanying 
challenges. Our insights also have implications for research 
on conflict in hybrids (Ashforth and Reingen 2014; Battilana 
and Dorado 2010; Glynn 2000), highlighting the analytical 
leverage of logic combinability, not just compatibility and 
centrality (Besharov and Smith 2014), in settings involving 
more than two logics. Because logic combinability influ-
ences the incentives for distinct factions to work with one 
another, it may help explain differential tendencies for col-
lusion among some groups versus others in hybrid organi-
zational contexts.
Limitations and Future Research
Our focus in this study was on understanding the challenges 
facing collective, voluntary social entrepreneurship ini-
tiatives and strategies through which organizations manage 
these challenges to sustain member participation. To do so, 
we studied eight cases that differed in age, size, location, 
and energy sources used. This approach enabled us to com-
pare different strategies and their implications for enabling 
ethical trade-offs and organizational growth. Because the 
theoretical insights developed through this research derive 
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from an inductive study of a single setting, their transfer-
ability and potential boundary conditions of course need to 
be considered. For example, the concrete form of temporal, 
structural, and collaborative compromise in our study was 
likely influenced by the German cooperative law and RE 
industry context. As the foregoing discussion has illustrated, 
however, these compromise strategies in their gestalt resem-
ble more general hybrid organizing strategies. As a result, 
our insights into the potential of such strategies to mitigate 
individuals’ dissatisfaction stemming from value conces-
sions may be transferable to other empirical settings and 
national contexts. In addition, while the collective, voluntary 
nature of the social enterprise initiatives we studied made 
members’ value tensions and organizational participation 
especially salient, other hybrid contexts are likely to face 
similar challenges. We expect our insights to be of particu-
lar relevance in settings such as participatory membership 
organizations pursuing double or triple bottom lines, as well 
as cross-sector alliances and public–private partnerships. We 
also encourage future research to explore how our insights 
may transfer to more traditional employment organizations, 
which often face competing institutional demands that lack 
a clear, agreed-upon priority ordering.
In addition, because the organizations we studied differed 
along multiple dimensions and we did not follow their devel-
opment in real time, future research is needed to address the 
antecedents of the strategies we uncovered and their devel-
opment over time. Our data offer suggestive evidence for 
factors at multiple levels of analysis. At the organizational 
level, initiative leaders and their approach to the coopera-
tive legal form may be particularly important. The founders 
of Case 5, for example, were drawn to the cooperative form 
because of its democratic principles. Commensurately, they 
developed a culture of joint discussion and leveraged collab-
orative compromise when value tensions started to surface 
among their organization’s members. In contrast, the leaders 
of Case 4 were drawn to the cooperative legal form because 
the specialized loan vehicle of a “Nachrangdarlehen” 
allowed for some separation of project ownership within a 
single organization. Consistent with this orientation, their 
RESCoop relied on structural compromise from the start. At 
the field level, cooperative association counselors may play 
an important role, as their central position in the network of 
existing and nascent RESCoops allows them to contribute to 
cross-organizational learning and the diffusion of best prac-
tices. For example, counselors’ recommendations to involve 
mayors and other local officials may support the emergence 
of a temporal compromise strategy, because members may 
be more likely to accept value concessions in the present and 
promises for compensatory action in the future when these 
commitments come from trusted authority figures. Longitu-
dinal and large N studies can further explore how these and 
other factors may jointly influence strategy choices.
Another area for future research concerns dynamics over 
time. In particular, future work can build on our findings 
about the implications of different strategies by exploring 
how organizations evolve in their use of strategies as they 
grow and develop. For example, studies can consider how 
organizations adopting a collaborative compromise approach 
can expand in scale, and whether doing so requires switching 
to a different strategy. Relatedly, research can also examine 
how collective social enterprises move from one compro-
mise strategy to another. There was suggestive evidence 
in our data that as RESCoops adopt new types of energy 
sources, particularly sources that are more contentious, their 
legacy compromise strategy may not be sufficient. In these 
situations, leaders may experiment with other strategies 
or reach out to cooperative association counselors for best 
practice advice, ultimately adopting a secondary compro-
mise strategy. For example, when Case 3 began exploring 
an opportunity to realize a biogas project, members voiced 
concerns even though they had previously accepted that the 
RESCoop would undertake solar and wind projects side by 
side through a structural compromise strategy. To appease 
members’ demands for a broader discussion of this new 
energy source, leaders adopted collaborative compromise 
as a secondary strategy. Single-case studies drawing on 
observational data and following collective social entrepre-
neurship initiatives as they develop can further unpack the 
dynamics of compromise strategies over time.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study contributes 
to research on collective forms of social entrepreneurship 
in pluralistic institutional environments by revealing novel 
challenges facing these voluntary initiatives and unpacking 
the mechanisms through which hybrid organizing strate-
gies can be used to manage them. We hope our work will 
inspire future studies to attend to this increasingly common 
and important form of hybrid organizing, helping collective 
social enterprises live up to their full potential in addressing 
critical societal problems.
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